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ADDITIONAL COMMAND-SPONSORED TOPICS
U.S. Army Pacific
G-5, Plans
POC: Rod Laszlo
NIPR: rodney.f.laszlo.civ@mail.mil
SIPR: rodney.laszlo@usarpac.army.smil.mil
1. North Korean SOF activities in the U.S./ROK rear-area during conflict.
2. B
 ehavior of North Korean soldiers during battle: specifically, will North Korean units fight to
the end or is there a chance for surrender? Is surrendering likely to be an individual decision,
or are the units controlled too tightly from a psychological standpoint? Does this depend on
the type of unit? What type of psychological preparation is given to North Korean soldiers in
preparation for the possibility of war with the U.S./ROK?
3.  Displaced Persons/Humanitarian Crisis following a conflict on peninsula: What are the likely
actions/behaviors and condition of North Korean civilians following a conflict? How will China
respond? Who will lead a humanitarian response effort? How is this synched with ongoing
combat operations? What role, and when, will international organizations (and regional powers)
play in such a response?
U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE)
POC: MG H. R. McMaster
herbert.r.mcmaster.mil@mail.mil
1. The Human Dimension:
a. W
 e believe organizational effectiveness increases when focusing on the human dimension.
What are the top 5 S&T priorities for research and development to move the human dimension
forward in support of the Army of 2020? Where do we focus limited resources to optimize
human performance?
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b. H
 ow can the human dimension enhance the Army’s ability to provide combat effective,
adaptable, trained, and resilient ready forces to meet our Nation’s needs in 2020 while
preserving the all volunteer force?
2. Air Ground Operations:
a. H
 ow do we develop and implement a maneuver leader training strategy to develop agile,
adaptive leaders who possess the knowledge, skills, abilities and attributes to effectively
conduct Air-Ground Combined Arms Operations on complex battlefields?
b. Assess the DOTMLPF gaps in the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to conduct Air Ground
Operations.
c. How does the joint community view of fixed, rotary, and unmanned vehicles fit into the
Army strategy? How does the joint view integrate with our fires, sustainment, and maneuver
strategy?
3. Robotics:
a. I dentify and assess the Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV),
and robotics requirements for the Army of 2020. How should organizations form to integrate
these capabilities?
b. Based on our description and analysis of future war and future combat, what adjustments
should we make to combat development in the areas of UGS, UAV, and robotics? How do
we accelerate progress and integrate across all DOTMLPF domains?
4. GCV:
a. E
 xamine the DOTMLPF implications of the capabilities requirements document for the
future Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV).
b. Based on our description and analysis of future war and future combat, is the current GCV
design adequate? What are recommended adjustments?
5. Future Combined Arms Operations:
a. E
 xamine the future BCT ability across DOTMLPF to execute combined operations in future
war and future combat. What Combined Arms Operations gaps exist in the BCT 2020?
b. How do we develop and implement a maneuver leader training strategy to develop agile,
adaptive leaders who possess the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attributes to train soldiers
to be successful in future Combined Arms Operations?
6. Recon and Security:
a. D
 o proposed changes to the BfSB incorporated in the current Reconnaissance and Surveillance
Brigade (R&S BDE) force design update (FDU) address identified gaps properly?
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b. E
 xamine the impacts of BCT 2020 and Sustainment 2020 related to the following discussion
points.
1) With BCT 2020 design and Sustainment 2020 concept, there are many competing demands
on CSSB which have yet to be analyzed holistically. The FiB retains its BSB but with
limited distribution capability, and still requires CSSB support. All functional brigades,
including the MEB, no longer have BSBs and require CSSB support for all sustainment
capability. With the removal of some sustainment capability within the BCTs to meet the
4,500 end-strength requirement, there are additional requirements for CSSB capabilities
(IBCT troop transport, BCT fuel distribution and fuel system supply point, BCT water
production, and some BCT distribution haul).
2) Force structure adjustments in the field artillery through TAA 14-18, as part of Army
2020, decreased EAB fires headquarters by 60 percent and more significantly, eliminated
100 percent of active component EAB cannon battalions, moving that capability to the
reserve component and to that capability currently present in the BCTs.
3) Air Defense Artillery force structure decisions through TAA 14-18 have, as part of Army
2020: eliminated 100 percent of divisional SHORAD battalions; migrated Corps ADA
BDEs to Theater; and eliminated 100 percent of active component Avenger battalions
limiting ADA capability that is available to the BCTs.
4) Under the intelligence 2020 concept, the AC will have one E-MIB, one in the ARNG and
two USAR with 12 total battalions which does not align well with supporting three corps
and 18 divisions. Currently, as the E-MIB is “emerging growth,” it has been recommended
by DA G-3/5/7 to be pushed into TAA 16-20.
7. Experimentation:
a. A
 ssess the current Army experimentation program to determine capability gaps and
opportunities to increase the combat effectiveness of the maneuver force.
b. Examine how FORSCOM interfaces with the institutional Army. Is FORSCOM satisfied with
current experimentation cooperation with TRADOC? Does FORSCOM desire a larger role in
the experimentation process? What is FORSCOM’s role in the experimentation process?

*****
The views expressed in this brief are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the official
policy or position of the Department of the Army, the
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
*****
More information on the Strategic Studies Institute’s
programs may be found on the Institute’s homepage at www.
StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.
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